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Abstract – The oligopoly structure of the market and the network constraints may produce results far from the 
perfect competition. Maintenance decisions in an oligopolistic electricity market have a strategic function, because 
GENCOs usually have impacts on market prices through capacity outages. 
This paper describes generation maintenance planning in an oligopolistic environment as a strategic decision. In 
this paper a game theoretic framework is modeled to analyze strategic behaviors of GENCOs. Each GENCO tries to 
maximize its payoff by strategically making decisions, taking into account its rival GENCOs’ decisions. Some GENCOs 
own DG units, such as wind, diesel, biomass and fuel cell plants. If different GENCOs find out they have the conditions 
of exerting market power exact in maintenance periods; they will share their data and they will cause some area 
monopolies.  
Cournot-Nash equilibrium is used for decision making on maintenance problem in Oligopolistic electricity market. 
The Cournot-Nash problem is modeled as a mixed integer nonlinear programming optimization problem. The analytic 
framework presented in this paper enables joint assessment of maintenance and generation strategies. 
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I. Nomenclature 
 
      
Variables: 
 
)(t
ij
g  Power generated by unit j of GENCOi in 
period t (MW). 
  
)(tG  Total energy supply in period t (MWh). 
i  GENCO. 
j  Generating unit. 
)(t
ij
m  Binary maintenance decision variable for unit 
j of GENCOi in period t (1 if unit j is on 
maintenance in period t and 0 otherwise).   
t  Time period. 
T  Number of time periods. 
)(t
i
P
 
Total energy supply of GENCOi in period t 
(MWh). 
      
Constants: 
)(tγ  Intercept of the linear price/demand curve 
($/MWh).  
)(tλ  Slope of the linear price/demand curve 
).($/(MWh)2   
a  Per unit constant. 
)(tD  Power demanded in period t (MW). 
ij
FOR  Forced outage rate of unit j of GENCOi.  
 
i
G  Set of indices of generating units owned by GENCOi.  
)(th  Hours of period t. 
I  Number of GENCOs.  
ij
MC  Maintenance cost of unit j of GENCOi 
($/MW). 
i
M  Maximum numbers of units in maintenance for GENCOi. 
ij
N  Duration of the maintenance outage of unit j 
of GENCOi. 
max
ij
P  Capacity of unit j of GENCOi. 
 
ij
PC  Production cost of unit j of GENCOi 
($/MWh). 
)(tR  Reserve requirement in period t. 
)(tv  Wind speed in period t. 
Iij
v  
Cut-in wind speed of wind unit j of GENCOi. 
Oij
v  Cut-out wind speed of wind unit j of 
GENCOi. 
Rij
v  Rated wind speed of wind unit j of GENCOi. 
 
)(max t
ij
WP  Available capacity of wind unit j of 
GENCOi. 
)(•ϕ  Wind power curve of wind unit j of 
GENCOi.  
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II. Introduction 
One of the optimization problems for mid-term power 
systems operations planning is Maintenance strategy 
which seems complicated. Some methods have been 
proposed recently to solve the maintenance scheduling of 
generating units. As a matter of fact, it is determining the 
maintenance duration for individual generators subject to 
several constraints over a given horizon.   
In a centralized electric power system, an appropriate 
generation maintenance scheduling is derived by the 
system operator and imposed to producers [1]. The 
reliability evaluation of maintenance scheduling and 
least-cost optimization algorithms had been one of the 
main concerns for the last few decades [2]. In most of the 
previous works, however, generators are maintained or 
not for system-wide reliability or least-cost rather than for 
their own profitability. In the new competitive 
environment, customers request for high reliability 
services with lower electricity prices, while GENCOs 
have to make their own profit [3]. 
In a competitive market environment, unit maintenance 
scheduling is determined through multiple interactions 
between ISO and GENCOs. It is objective law of the 
market that every economic individual follows its own 
maximization of benefits; therefore, GENCOs will try to 
schedule their units for maintenance in order to maximize 
their benefit. The ISO seeks a generation maintenance 
annual plan that ensures similar reliability through the 
weeks of the year, prior to the ISO’s coordination 
process, individual GENCOs should have their own 
maintenance strategies in advance [3]. 
In deregulated power systems usually GENCOs have 
independence to maintain their generators in a 
decentralized manner [4]. Strategic behaviors of 
GENCOs can be modeled in a game theoretic framework, 
and players of the game correspond to GENCOs.  
Maintenance of generating units may cause outage of a 
significant amount of its capacity. Withdrawing 
generation capacity is a strategic decision GENCOs 
adopt in order to increase electricity prices. Maintenance 
decisions is a way of withdrawing some parts of 
generation capacity for a period of time, therefore, it has 
potentially major impacts on spot prices and attains a 
strategic dimension in oligopolistic electricity markets 
[4]. 
   There are two types of methods for developing bidding 
strategies in electricity markets: game-based and 
nongame-based methods. The game-based method, which 
will be used in this project, utilizes the game theory to 
simulate bidding behaviors of Gencos and develop Nash 
equilibrium bidding strategies for them in electricity 
markets.  
   Usually, the bidding strategies of Gencos are based on 
their opponents’ bidding behavior, the forecasted 
demand, and at last but not least power system operating 
conditions. Hence the bidding strategy problem is 
formulated as a bi-level problem in which the upper-level 
sub-problem maximizes Genco’s payoffs and the lower-
level sub-problem solves the market clearing problem. 
In the real markets, many factors or parameters may be 
effect on the bidding strategy of Gencos. One of the most 
important parameter is demand elasticity. In a real 
market, the amount of demand isn’t independent of price 
and price increment is equal to demand decrement. In this 
condition, Gencos should devise a good bidding strategy 
with regard to demand elasticity. The other important 
parameter is Genco’s tendency to sell their outputs in the 
other markets such as ancillary service markets (Reserve, 
reactive, and …). As known, in the restructured power 
system, the services, which provide the security and 
safety of system, are obtained through markets namely 
Ancillary service markets. In the power systems, the 
supply for reserve comes from generators, which also 
supply the energy market; therefore the energy and 
reserve markets should operate simultaneously. Because 
of price difference between energy and reserve market, 
the allocated capacity for each market is very important 
and will affect on the obtained profit of Gencos [5]. 
Therefore, Gencos should try to maximize their 
accumulated profits in both markets with choosing the 
optimum bidding strategy.  
In this study, a game theoretic framework is suggested 
to solve maintenance scheduling of generating units 
including DGs under oligopolistic market environment. 
Gaming considerations can earn GENCOs higher profit 
because they can effectively exercise market power when 
their competitors’ capacity is on maintenance [4]. The 
optimal strategy profile is defined by Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium of the game. 
A hypothetical test system is considered to show the 
applicability of the proposed model. The results obtained 
point out that maintenance scheduling can be one of the 
important strategic behaviors whereby GENCOs 
maximize their profit in an oligopolistic. Their behavior 
is also compared due to changes in price elasticity. 
 
III. Market Power 
There are two main reasons why the potential of 
market power is brought to the electricity market. First 
there is market dominance and then there are 
transmission constraints [6]. Market power due to market 
dominance is a scenario that applies for every imperfect 
market and it does not belong to electricity markets. On 
the electricity market, a supplier that is large enough to 
affect the price can exploit market power by either 
economical withholding or physical withholding. When 
dealing with economical withholding a seller keeps 
bidding above the marginal cost of production and 
thereby driving up the price. Physical withholding simply 
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means that a seller withholds some of its available 
capacity. 
Market power due to transmission constraints makes it 
necessary to get a full understanding of the topology of 
the transmission system before starting any plan of 
detecting the potential for market power [7]. 
If a supplier is placed within a so called load pocket, 
this participant will have a local market power. A 
supplier in this case can find himself in a position of 
monopoly by intentionally create congestion and limit 
access of competitors. This means that, by getting 
dispatched at strategic points in the network, a supplier in 
a load pocket can gain profit even by increasing its 
generation rather than withholding it [8]. Conclusively, 
transmission constraints in the electricity market make it 
possible even for a small supplier to exploit market 
power. 
In a Network, loads can’t be accurately forecasted and 
energy can’t be stored economically. Demand and supply 
must be balance all the time in order to maintain the 
system frequency, voltage, stabilization standards; 
Kirchhoff’s laws and impedance of the whole network 
determine the power flows in the system [9]. When there 
is congestion, generating capacity in congested area will 
be relative scarcity, so congestion results in locational 
market power and causes invalidation of the optimization 
of generating resources in the whole network [10]. 
The LMP represents the willingness to supply an 
additional MW of load at a particular location. It is useful 
to break the LMP into parts to distinguish between costs 
resulting from network losses and those resulting from 
network congestion. The LMP includes a reference cost 
of generation and relative costs of congestion and losses 
in the system: 
LMP = (generation marginal costs) + (congestion cost) 
+ (cost of marginal losses). 
The generator marginal cost is taken from a specified 
reference generator in the system. The congestion cost 
represents the effect of congestion on the LMP relative to 
the reference generator marginal cost. 
Market power due to transmission constraints makes it 
necessary to get a full understanding of the topology of 
the transmission system before starting any plan of 
detecting the potential for market power [11]. 
A load pocket is an area where transmission constraints 
make it impossible to transfer electricity from elsewhere 
than from the local supplier. If a supplier is placed within 
a so called load pocket, this participant will have a local 
market power. A supplier in this case can find himself in 
a position of monopoly by intentionally create congestion 
and limit access of competitors. This means that, by 
getting dispatched at strategic points in the network, a 
supplier in a load pocket can gain profit even by 
increasing its generation rather than withholding it [12]. 
Conclusively, transmission constraints in the electricity 
market make it possible even for a small supplier to 
exploit market power. 
IV. Monopoly and Monopolistic 
Competition 
Monopolistic competition is a market structure where 
there are many firms (like a competitive market), but 
these firms have some market power (they are able to set 
price above MC profitably).  A monopoly is the only 
supplier of a good for which there is no close substitute.  
 
 
Fig 1. Monopoly model of electricity market based on (Hunt and 
Shuttle   worth, 1996) 
 
 
The Minimum Efficient Size (MES) of a firm in a 
particular industry provides a rough indication of the 
number of competitors that one is likely to find in the 
market for the product of this industry. This MES is 
equal to the level of output that minimizes the average 
cost for a typical firm in that industry. The shape of this 
curve is determined by the technology used to produce 
the goods. If, as illustrated in Figure 2(a), the MES is 
much smaller than the demand for the goods at this 
minimum average cost, the market should be able to 
support a large number of competitors. On the other 
hand, if, as shown in Figure 2(b), the MES is comparable 
to the demand, the market cannot support two profitable 
firms and a monopoly situation is likely to develop. 
 
 
Fig 2. Concept of MES. (a) Competitive market, (b) Monopoly 
situation 
 
Transmission is a natural monopoly. It is currently 
almost inconceivable that a group of investors would 
 
M. A. Fotouhi Ghazvini, A. Estebsari 
decide to build a completely new transmission network 
designed to operate in competition with an existing one. 
Because of their visual impact on the environment, it is 
indeed most unlikely that the construction of competing 
transmission lines along similar routes would be allowed. 
Furthermore, the minimum efficient size of a 
transmission network is such that electricity transmission 
is considered a good example of a natural monopoly.  
In general, network constraints increase opportunities 
for strategic bidding because not all generators are 
connected in locations where they can relieve a given 
constraint. In many cases, the number of generators that 
can effectively affect a constraint is small. Congestion in 
the transmission network can therefore transform a 
reasonably competitive global market into a collection of 
smaller local energy markets. Since these smaller markets 
inevitably have fewer active participants than the global 
market, some of them are likely to be able to exert market 
power. Such scenarios are not easy to detect or analyze 
[13 , 14]. 
 
V. Equations 
A.  Cournot Model 
In order to analyze real markets, economists have 
developed models between two extreme cases, perfect 
competition and pure monopoly. Perfect competition is 
very difficult to attain in electricity industry, mainly 
because of the small number of players that compete. 
Oligopoly competition refers to a market structure where 
a few players coexist. Taking perfect competition and 
monopoly models as the end points, there is an infinite 
number of theoretical possibilities for oligopoly models, 
all of which differ mainly in the assumptions used to 
characterize market structure and firm interdependencies. 
The Cournot model has become a classic in 
microeconomic oligopoly theory. The Cournot model of 
oligopoly has arguably been the most successful one, 
mostly due to its mathematical tractability and ability to 
represent well short-term and mid-term problems. 
Cournot games have the following characteristics in 
common:  
• competition occurs only in quantities 
• product is homogeneous 
• market price is determined by auction  
• Players schedule for their production 
simultaneously.  
In the Cournot model, each firm chooses an output 
quantity to maximize profit. It is assumed that quantities 
produced are immediately sold. Market price in the 
model is determined through an auction process that 
equates industry supply with aggregate demand. 
Examples of Cournot style auction-based pricing can be 
found in organized markets such as those for agricultural 
products like wheat, corn, and rice. The model also 
assumes that all firms in the industry can be identified at 
the start of the game, and that decision-making by firms 
occurs simultaneously [15].  
Each firm is sufficiently large to influence market price 
received by all, and the quantity produced by other firms. 
Each firm maximizes its own profit given the quantity 
chosen by other firms expressed as [12]. 
( ) ( )1)(,),(
i
q
i
CiqiqPi
q
i
q
i
qi −′⋅=′π
 
)(⋅iπ  
profit of player given the production strategy of all 
other players i′ ; 
i
q  production strategy of player i; 
)(⋅P  price as a function of all q’s i.e., firms i, i', etc. 
This is the main characteristic of an oligopolistic 
market that distinguishes such markets from a 
perfectly competitive one—players can influence 
market price by changing their production as 
opposed to a “price taker” behavior exhibited in a 
competitive market; 
)(⋅
i
C  cost as a function of production strategy iq . 
 
The solution of the game is obtained by solving a set 
of simultaneous equations representing the first order 
optimality conditions for each firm i [16]. 
It is well known that the Cournot oligopoly has a Nash 
equilibrium in which every firm has its maximum profit 
while assuming that other firms have fixed their outputs. 
It is apparent that when all firms have reached such a 
point, none has any incentive to change unilaterally, and 
so the situation is viewed as the market equilibrium [17]. 
The Nash equilibrium formation of Cournot’s duopoly 
model is shown in Fig. 3. The two axes define the output 
of the firms. In this model the reaction curve represents 
how much each firm would produce given the production 
decision from the other firm. The Nash equilibrium 
defines where each firm has maximized profit, given the 
output of the other. 
B. GENCOs' Cournot Behavior 
The Cournot model is often used to describe the behavior 
of generating companies (GENCOs) in electricity 
markets. We consider n GENCOs, assume that each 
GENCO uses a Cournot model to derive its generation 
and maintenance scheduling in the market, and obtain 
some relevant analytical results characterizing the 
market. GENCOs are assumed to maximize profit 
according to the Cournot assumption using production 
quantities as the decision variable. It is considered that 
the transmission network does not influence the 
equilibrium, i.e., that no network constraint is binding. 
Cournot models are often encountered in the technical 
literature as they adequately represent producer behavior 
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in real-world markets [18]. 
 
Fig. 3.  Nash-Cournot Equilibrium in duopoly model. 
 
A Cournot-Nash equilibrium outcome is characterized 
by the familiar Nash equilibrium concept that no player 
can gain any additional profit by changing its own 
generation strategy while every other player keeps its 
own generation unchanged [4]. 
Since GENCOs tend to make repetitive decisions, it is 
expected that they will learn from the market. For each 
time period, GENCOs must form an expectation of their 
rivals' output in the subsequent period in order to 
determine their own corresponding profit-maximizing 
quantity for the next period, and so on [19]. 
 
VI. Profit Maximization Model 
 
GENCOs would try to extract maximum profit by 
scheduling their maintenance in a period to meet with 
least opportunity costs, and to make the most of all other 
periods when its competitors' generators are scheduled 
for maintenance. We may think of each GENCO trying to 
work out the best generation strategy as well as the 
maintenance decisions by looking at the mutual impact of 
maintenance on their base reaction function [3 , 4]. 
Individual GENCOs' objective for Counot-Nash 
equilibrium is as follows:  
 
( )2
1 1
)(2)(
2
1
1 1
)(max
1 1
)()(
1
)()()(
2
1
)(:
∑ 







∑
∑








∑ ∑
∑








∑ ∑
∑ 





= =
⋅⋅−
= = ∈
⋅⋅−
= = ∈
⋅⋅−
=
⋅⋅⋅−
T
t
I
i
tiPt
T
t
I
i iGj
tijmijPijMC
T
t
I
i iGj
ijPCthtijg
T
t
tGtGttMax
λ
λγ
 
 
Subject to 
( )3,)()()( ti
iGj
tiPtijgth ∀∀∈
=⋅ ∑  
( )4
1
)()( t
I
i
tGtiP ∀=
=∑  
( )5max)( t
ij
Pt
ij
go ∀≤≤
 
 
Equation (2) may be explained as follows [4]. 
 
• The first term represents the revenue earned by 
firms under perfect competition. 
• The next two terms represents the costs of firms. 
• The first three terms together represent the net 
market benefit under perfect competition. 
• The last term applies the effect of oligopolistic 
competition to objective function. 
 
The set of constraints of the maintenance scheduling 
problem of GENCOi are given below. 
 
1) Minimum Net Reserve: This constraint ensures a net 
reserve above a specified threshold for all periods [1] 
( )6)(
1
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In equation (7) minimum reserve constant ensures higher 
reserve in periods with higher loads, which is an 
appropriate criterion.  
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2) Maintenance Outage Duration: The following 
constraint ensures for each unit that it is maintained the 
required number of time periods [20] 
( )8.,
1
)(
i
Gji
T
t ij
Ntijm ∈∀∀=
=∑
 
3) Continuous Maintenance: The constraint below 
ensures that the maintenance of any unit must be 
completed once it begins [12] 
( )9.,,)1()1()(
i
Gjti
ij
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ij
mt
ij
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ij
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4) Maximum Number of Units Simultaneously in 
maintenance: Constraint (10) limits the maximum number 
of units that GENCOi can maintain at the same time [1] 
( )10.,)( ti
i
M
iGj
tijm ∀∀≤∈
∑
 
5) Maintenance Exclusion: This constraint enforces the 
impossibility of maintaining two prespecified unit of the 
same GENCO at the same time [12] 
( )11.,1)()( tit
ji
mt
ij
m ∀∀≤
′
+
It means simultaneous maintenance of unit j and j′  of 
GENCOi is impossible. 
 
6) Wind Power Curve: Incorporating wind generators 
into the existing utility generation scheduling problem 
add further complexity to the solution methodology. The 
total available wind generation can be obtained from the 
wind speed by applying the wind power curve [21].  
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VII. Regulations by ISO 
It should be noted that the role of ISO is to ensure 
system security. Therefore, it must agree with GENCOs 
on a generation maintenance plan that preserves system 
security. The ISO solves a maintenance scheduling 
problem involving all units, independently on which 
GENCO owns each unit, with the target of maximizing 
the reliability throughout the weeks of the year. 
Sufficiently accurate load forecasts for the whole year are 
considered known [20].  
The ISO compares the maintenance outage timing 
scheduled by GENCOs with its desired timing. If the 
reliability index of two plans are closed to each other, the 
ISO accepts the GENCO's decision, If not ISO 
encourages GENCOs to alter their plan by proposing 
incentives. The objective function of ISO can be 
formulated as follow 
  .              
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 (10) 
The ISO considers the constraints mentioned for 
generating units. It also has a constraint which guarantees 
a net reserve above a specified threshold for all periods 
[1] 
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(11) 
VIII. Case Study 
Results for a hypothetical system which is mostly based 
on IEEE reliability test system containing   some DG 
units are reported in this section. Consider a system 
comprising of 17 units, owned by 6 GENCOs. Table I 
shows a list of GENCOs data and Table II shows the type 
of generating units with their forced outage rates. 
 
 
TABLE I 
HYPOTHETICAL TEST SYSTEM 
GENCOs 
Uni
t  
Production 
Cost 
($/MWh) 
Capacity 
(MW) 
Maintenance 
Cost ($/MW) 
Maintenance 
Requirement 
GENCO
1 
13 17 44 28 4 
14 14 40 12 2 
 15 58 22 8 1 
 16 60 6 12 1 
GENCO
2 
8 55 100 16 3 
9 52 36 13 1 
 10 50 23 7 2 
GENCO
3 
5 53 155 21 2 
6 53 155 21 2 
 7 53 155 21 2 
GENCO
4 
11 12 70 7 2 
12 21 60 9 3 
GENCO
5 
1 72 400 18 3 
2 64 197 23 2 
 3 62 197 24 2 
 4 64 100 19 1 
GENCO
6 17 72 400 20 2 
 
For simplicity, all of the wind generators represented 
an equivalent wind farm to concentrate on the effects of 
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technique constraints in the test system. All wind 
generators are assumed to have the same cut-in, rated, 
and cut-out wind speeds (2.5 m/s, 12 m/s, 25 m/s) 
respectively. In Fig. 2 wind speed data are shown for 24 
periods [3]. 
 
 
 
TABLE II 
GENERATING UNITS SPECIFICATIONS 
Unit's type Capacity (MW) Forced Outage Rate 
Diesel 36,23 0.04 
Oil #6 197 0.05 
Molten Carbonate 
Fuel Cell 22 0 
Oil #2 100 0.04 
Wind Farm 70,60 0.14 
Biomass Plant 44,40 0.06 
Nuclear 400 0.12 
Coal 155 0.04 
Phosphoric Acid 
Fuel Cell 6 0.01 
 
 
The problem horizon T is 24 periods. Periods can have 
different lengths of time (days, weeks…). The load 
profile is shown in Fig. 5 [3]. 
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Fig. 4.  Wind speed in 24 periods. 
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Fig. 5. Demand profile of test system.  
 
In case 1 we consider a system with the inverse load 
curve being identical for all 24 periods: 
900)( =tγ and 04.0)( =tλ . The strategic maintenance 
scheduling is shown in Fig. 6.  
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Fig. 6. Maintenance scheduling plan (Case 1). 
 
Next, we consider the load curve to have a higher 
intercept and be more inelastic with 
1000)( =tγ and 03.0)( =tλ  in periods 7 to 18 (case 2). 
This will shift maintenance of some units from these 
periods to periods with more elastic load curve (Fig. 7). 
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Fig. 7. Maintenance scheduling plan (Case 2). 
 
 In case 3 we consider higher price elasticity at low 
demand periods. Usually at low demand periods, 
consumers can reduce their consumption when price goes 
up. In case 4, higher price elasticity is considered for high 
load periods. Fig. 8 compares maintenance decisions in 
these two cases.  
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Fig. 8. Maintenance scheduling plan (case 3 and case 4). 
   
   It is concluded that GENCOs prefer to put their 
maintenance outages in periods with higher price 
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elasticity and they prefer to produce energy in inelastic 
periods. 
As it has been mentioned ISO consider reliability in 
the system. If the reliability index of GENCO plans are 
closed to ISO plan, the ISO accepts the GENCO's 
decision, If not ISO encourages GENCOs to alter their 
plan by proposing incentives. The problem in this 
situation is network constraints. Energy supplying 
companies may be accountable for having monopolistic 
potential, even though there are several other suppliers 
openly competing with them on the market. If some of 
these GENCOS share their data and find the above 
maintenance scheduling plan which maximize their 
profits they can put their maintenance in the elastic 
periods. This means that they withdraw some of their 
production capacities in these periods. As ISO will 
propose its maintenance scheduling plan these GENCOS 
will not be able to withdraw in application. So they 
decide to bid this difference amount of energy at very 
higher prices. ISO has to buy to prevent reliability 
problems. This profit maximization is considered as a 
market power exerting. 
IX. Conclusion 
In this paper a simple framework which is easy to 
implement has been reviewed. We proposed this 
framework before because it requires a reasonably small 
amount of computing time and a small amount of data 
communication. Here the framework has been 
implemented in practice of a case model under 
considering the monopoly threat. It is presented based on 
the fact that GENCOs will try to strategically place their 
maintenance and dispatch their generators taking into 
consideration their rivals’ strategies. But this profit 
maximization may lead to market power if some 
GENCOs want to exit the oligopolistic structure and 
make locational monopolies. The results show that 
maintenance scheduling of generating units and DGs 
depend on price elasticity of load curve. The proposed 
method implicitly assumes that each GENCO is able to at 
least “predict” the capacity and cost parameters of its 
competitor GENCOs—a supposition that is not 
impractical. The game theory which is considered to 
study electricity markets' behavior is usually based on 
Cournot game. The application of other models such as 
Bertrand games and supply function equilibrium which 
might exhibit a better explanation of a real market should 
still be further investigated. 
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